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Abstract
Our project on fatness begins by turning attention to the multiple cultural instances in which fatness has been intrinsically
linked with notions such as self—neglect and poor self—management. In Foucauldian terms, we analyse the fat subject
as a failed homo economicus, an individual who has failed to be an “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own
capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). From
this perspective, we analyse instances of collective hatred towards fat subjects as direct results of the biopolitical triplet of
responsibility, rationality, andmorality. Morality is our bridge into the field of posthumanism, in which, as we demonstrate,
these biopolitical imperatives also apply, reinforced by the field’s fascination with prosthetics and enhancement. Where,
by biopolitical standards, fat subjects have failed to manage themselves, posthuman subjects find themselves guilty of not
responsibly, rationally, and morally manipulating themselves to optimal productivity. Using criticism that disability studies
scholars like Sarah S. Jain andVivian Sobchack have voiced about posthumanism,we demonstrate theways inwhich, within
posthumanism, all subjects can be found as lacking when compared to their potential, enhanced posthuman version.
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1. Introduction
“The writing of the posthumanist condition should
not seek to fashion ‘scriptural tombs’ for humanism,
but must, rather, take the form of a critical practice
that occurs inside humanism, consisting not of the
wake but theworking-through of humanist discourse.”
(Badmington, 2003, p. 20)
When Neil Badmington (2003) suggests that we adopt
a critical practice inside humanism, he hints at the pos-
sibility that posthumanism must prove itself worthy of
performing such critical practices without falling into the
trap of reproducing the pitfalls of humanist discourse.
The following essay attempts not only to expose the
danger of such pitfalls for posthumanism, but also of-
fers ways of reflecting on contested humanity by way of
engaging embodied theories. The (fat) body here does
not serve as an object of study, but rather as an agent
that reveals the objectifying effects of neoliberal biopo-
litical discourse. Fat bodies thus become part of a critical
way of theorising human life from a posthumanist per-
spective. The fat body’s relation to posthumanist theory
is specific in that it poses a conceptual problem to the
posthumanist’s critical stance towards human embodi-
ment and bodily enhancement. The fat body, similar to,
yet different from, the generic “disabled” body cannot be
enhanced by technology, as technology is widely under-
stood, but only bymoral discipline and self-management.
While prosthetic enhancements are seen as an external
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“solution” to disability, the fat body needs to employ in-
ternal, moralized technologies of discipline, such as diet
and exercising, in order to comply with productive nor-
mativity. Our argument in this article is that bodily en-
hancement (technological as well as moral) is at the core
of not only humanity, but also of the seemingly critical
and potentially more inclusive post-humanity. Also, that
the concept of the fat body, with the help of a critically
informed discourse on disability and bioethics, helps to
reveal and hopefully contest the dependency of all hu-
manity on this core.
The overall aim of this paper is to bring critical
posthuman theories into productive dialogue with cur-
rent social and cultural trends towards bodily “unifor-
mity” in the name of human enhancement. This attempt
not only serves as a critique of public discourses and prac-
tices by way of analysing popular websites and online fo-
rums on “fat hatred”; it also aims to bring to the fore
that our contemporary bodies are subjected to a pow-
erful machinery built on neoliberal, moralistic, and ratio-
nalist cultural ideologies that target specific bodies more
than others. Motivated by a critical disability studies cri-
tique of social inequality on the basis of bodily ability,
we take the marginal field of fat studies as a conceptual
bridge between the discourse around typically marginal-
ized bodies and the more general problem of the body
for the constitution of all humanity or post-humanity.
The first case study used in this essay is an image
taken from a website called Health Fitness Revolution
(HFR)1 (Figure 1). What is first presented to the viewer
of the homepage of HFR is a series of rotating images
that function as links to articles promoting fitness, phys-
ical activity, and healthy nutritional habits. Articles with
titles like “You Are What Your Father Eats”, “Healthy VS
Unhealthy Diet”, “How to Live to 100”, “Best Foods to
Fight Fatigue”, “Best Foods for Alzheimer’s Disease”, and
“The Benefits of Biking” follow each other in a succes-
sion which, for all stated purposes, is not explicitly about
or against fatness. These articles are focused on passing
down the wisdom of well-being and recipes for longevity,
strength, fitness, and even mental health. If anything, di-
eting and nutrition are props to the sacred mission of
healthy living. We have chosen this website as represen-
tative of themany dedicated to the ongoing ‘War Against
Obesity’ initiative in the United States. The article on
which we have chosen to focus, titled “Tips for Overcom-
ing aWeight Loss Plateau”, delivers advice on how to suc-
cessfully continue one’s diet, the key word here being
continue. This article targets people who are already di-
eting: sound, rational homines economici. If application
of economic to social models is to work, its subject must
be a rational homo economicus. The reader of this arti-
cle is thus not addressed as potentially being a fat sub-
ject, but instead as a properly functioning individual, ded-
icated to maintaining his or her good health, and by ex-
tension, his or her capital. We would like to dig a bit fur-
ther into what this assumption—that the visitor of the
website is already awell-functioning homo economicus—
reveals about the mechanisms that produce the knowl-
edge (and thus rationality) allotted to this subject as his
or her primary mode of operation.
The image accompanying the article (Figure 1) de-
picts two men standing next to each other, one of them
muscular, holding gym weights and an apple, and the
1 http://www.healthfitnessrevolution.com
Figure 1. HFR “Tips for overcoming a weight loss plateau” (30 May 2016).
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other overweight, holding a hamburger and a package
of fries. Both of the men’s abdomens are hollow, and in-
side their bellies one can see a machine and a construc-
tion crew. The muscular man’s machine is made of shiny
silver. His construction crew is comprised of two well-
dressedmen consulting a diagram and a worker, clad in a
white uniform and propped up on a ladder, tinkeringwith
some cogs in the centre. Themachine in the fat man’s ab-
domen, on the other hand, is rusty and appears dirty and
neglected. The working crew is comprised of four men
not in uniform, their attire dirty and worn.
The metaphors in this image suggest that if you eat
well and exercise, your bodywill function like awell-oiled
machine. By making the ‘right’ choices, you supply your
body with the ‘right’ crew that will make effective, well
thought-out, rational decisions in the maintenance of
your body-machine, keeping it in the best possible condi-
tion. The key word is maintenance. As depicted in the im-
age, the machine already appears to function well, need-
ing onlyminimal tinkering from theworker. If, in contrast,
one makes the wrong choices, one’s body-machine will
be neglected, rusty, and low-functioning. The workers in
one’s own body will operate under no instructions from
a knowledgeable, rational authority. Instead of maintain-
ing an already functioning machine, these workers scat-
ter over its entire width and appear more as though they
are trying to salvage it from total destruction.
In what seems an almost too literal representation of
the Foucauldian subject-machine, the successful homo
economicus, represented by the muscular torso, demon-
strates the correct management of this man’s capital.
His machine, his ability to work, which “cannot be sepa-
rated from the worker himself” (Foucault, 2008, p. 224),
is given proper care in order to ensure that the human
capital in question will be at a maximum. The fit man
also serves to represent the image’s imagined visitor and
target audience, the economic subject who has incorpo-
rated this valuable knowledge and has accordingly re-
sponded “in a non-random way, in a systematic way”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 269). Systemic here means rational,
or rationalistic, as in Val Plumwood’s critique of the ne-
oliberal market logic (Plumwood, 2002, p. 14).
Rationality, or rationalism, is a central notion in the
self-management of the homo economicus. The ability
to adjust and respond to information provided ensures
that the homo economicus’ enterprise functions under
the best possible regulation. As Thomas Lemke explains
in “The birth of bio-politics: Michel Foucault’s lecture at
the Collège de France on neo-liberal governmentality”
(2001),
“Awarded with ‘absolute’ liberty regarding the main-
tenance of themselves, neoliberal subjects must now
prove worthy of this gift, by demonstrating their best
possible behaviour in their management of their lives.
According to Foucault, this neo-liberal homo economi-
cus ‘becomes a behavioristically manipulable being
and the correlative of a governmentality which sys-
tematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’
and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of the individu-
als.” (p. 13)
Thus, the neoliberal homo economicus is left to operate
in a field of seemingly endless freedom, unaware of the
fact that all of his supposedly informed and rational ma-
noeuvres are the direct results of a specifically framed
‘regime of truth’, where ‘truth’ is formed and authorised
in particular manners.
The websites we will analyse in this essay are ex-
amples of the kinds of places where that ‘truth’ about
embodied rationalism is generated and distributed. The
websites themselves base their arguments on specific
biomedical narratives about fatness. They also function
as a bridge between scientific discourse and the public
under the promotion of the state. However, it is not the
responsibility of any state to enforce rational conduct on
its citizens; the state is only there to provide them with
the knowledge needed for them to conduct themselves
in the expected rational way.
Current literature within fat studies has taken up the
analysis between the individual fat body and the neolib-
eral machine. Scholars such as Paul Campos (2005) and
J. Eric Oliver (2006) have taken critical stances to anal-
yse the current epidemiological obesity discourse. These
critical approaches are centred on debunking commonly
heldmedical ‘facts’ about ‘obesity’ and analysing obesity
as a social rather than a medical issue. However, by in-
sisting that we employ the terms ‘obesity’ and ‘obese’,
such work errs on two levels. In criticising Campos for
substituting “good” science with “bad” science, Michael
Gard (2008) points out how these scholars continue to
uncritically subscribe to a problematic, positivist ideal
of health morality, and Charlotte Cooper, in “Mapping
the Field” (2010), comments on the “scientific” distance
this body of work seems to have from its fat subjects—
fatness remains a topic that needs to be discussed and
spoken for by removed, “objective” experts. This article
instead wishes to continue the approach outlined in the
Fat Studies Reader (2009), edited by Esther Rothblum
and Sondra Solovay, where, in close dialogue with fat
activism, fat scholars speak for themselves, politicising,
theorising, and analysing through their embodied experi-
ence as surviving subjects within neoliberalism. The anal-
ysis that thus follows will do its best to avoid any notion
of a detached, medical view, and instead dive into the ex-
amination of the object in a constant dialogue with our
own embodiment.
The image of the fat man’s torso in the picture de-
livers a powerful message: the body is a machine for
which the subject is responsible. Faced with the freedom
of choosing between apples and fries, working out and
burgers, the subject finds two separate paths: the first is
the path of rationality and responsibility, which will guar-
antee optimal results for the body-machine—results that
will be reflected both on the inside (the shiny machine
itself) and on the outside (the muscular body which is
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directly proportionate to the condition of the machine).
The second path is the antithesis of the first—on this
road, the subject fails to embody neoliberal rationalism
in several ways: the fat torso betrays the systemic laws of
efficient and goal-oriented labour, and theworkers in the
fat body work without a plan, lacking scientific, techno-
cratic methods. He fails to succeed as a neoliberal work-
ing subject, and fails to fulfil his public function by po-
tentially creating a threat to the functioning of the larger
“machine” of society. Here, fatness becomes the signifier
not only for the dysfunctionality of the individual body,
but also for the rationalistic world providing this body
with (failed) opportunities. The imageof the fatman func-
tions as a cautionary tale for the website’s visitor: this is
what will happen to yourmachine, your capital, your role
in society, as well as your humanity, if you neglect your
economic responsibilities as a neoliberal subject.
Nevertheless, it would be short-sighted to identify
the website’s visitors entirely with the image of the fit
man, and to position the fat man as only a cautionary
figure. If that were the case, the website itself would be
redundant. In a more nuanced metaphor, we think it is
possible to claim that there are three planes of existence
within which the visitor, the fit man and the fat man,
reside. Drawing from religious imagery, we would say
that on the left side of the image lies Heaven—a produc-
tive, well-adjusted, rational, well-functioning neoliberal
Heaven. Even the colours of the left side of the image, the
steel-colouredwhiteness, and the shinymachinery seem
to suggest this. On the right side lies Hell—dumpy, grey,
rusty, malfunctioning Hell. And right in the middle, right
where the visitor is unconsciously positioned, lies Purga-
tory. The visitor is most likely not as shiny, muscular, or fit
as the man on the left. However, based on the tone and
the content of the article that accompanies these images,
the visitor is also not assumed to be the lost cause that is
theman on the right. Instead, the visitor is trapped in Pur-
gatory, standing at the crossroads, repenting for old sins,
and thus his inability to enter Heaven, but not having
yet committed the penultimate crime of forsaking self-
management, and so not quite in Hell. Which road will
the visitor choose: the one that offers a shiny, nutritious
apple? Or the other, which presents a greasy, unhealthy
hamburger? The religious undertones of such a reading
of the image inevitably bring us to the question of who
might be the ‘priest’ of this ‘religion’, as well as what this
‘religion’ actually entails. In the following parts, we will
utilise Nikolas Rose’s theory on pastoral power in order
to explore the first part of the question, about the neolib-
eral religion’s priest.
2. Pastoral Power and Homo Economicus
In The Politics of Life Itself (2007), Nicholas Rose writes
about pastoral power that it
“is not organized or administered by ‘the state….It
takes place in a plural and contested field traversed
by the codes pronounced by ethics committees and
professional associations, by the empirical findings
generated by researchers, the attitudes and criteria
used by employers and insurers, the tests developed
and promoted by psychologists and biotech compa-
nies, the advice offered by self-help organizations,
and even, one might add, the critical perspectives
contributed by religious organizations and sociologi-
cal critics.” (p. 73)
When trying to identify which organising field of pastoral
power HFR uses, our first reaction was to identify it as a
‘self-help’ organisation. The website does not posit itself
explicitly as such. It does not pose as a help manual; it
proposes a ‘revolution’. We believe that this perception
of the website’s disposition has to do with the tone of
a subtext that posits the website as there to “help you
help yourself”. What is, however, important about pas-
toral power and its practice is that it is relational, not
unidirectional. Using human reproduction as an example,
Rose describes how,
“[Pastoral Power] works through the relation be-
tween the affects and ethics of the guider—the
genetic counsellors and allied experts of reproduc-
tion who operate as gatekeepers to tests and med-
ical procedures—and the affects and ethics of the
guided—the actual or potential parents who are mak-
ing their reproductive decisions, and their networks
of responsibility and obligation.” (2007, p. 74)
Thus, the website’s decision to position its visitor as
an already properly functioning, rational subject can
be interpreted as a strategic move in the practice of
pastoral power. The website “pretends” that it is not
there to lecture, but to have a friendly conversation
between equals. Pastoral power enables the creation
of a series of microtechnologies, which—unlike the
sovereign powermodel, which requires a knowledgeable
lecturer and a submissive receiver—place participants
on a reciprocal level.
As pastoral power is two-directional, we cannot
speak of one of its ends without taking into account its
other. However, we would argue that, in the example of
the HFR website, the perceived ‘pastor’ of the interac-
tion is the main focus. Although we could extract a num-
ber of observations about the website’s visitor through
the way the website is designed, he or she does not have
a direct voice in the discussion. For that reason, we de-
cided to offer a second case, an online community called
Reddit. Using this community, we will explore what hap-
pens when the authority shifts from a perceived ‘expert’
to the ‘general public’, and explore the different kind of
divisions that this shift creates.
Reddit is an online platform comprised of hundreds
of forums, called ‘subreddits’, all of which have been cre-
ated and are continuously moderated by users. Mate-
rial in the subreddits is also user-generated; users can
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post links to articles, images, and videos, or submit an
original text of their own writing. Every subreddit has its
own theme, its own rules, its own etiquette, and, often,
its own Wiki page. One can usually find the rules and
Wiki page, as well as links to previous, archived posts
that could prove useful for a new user in the sidebar of
the page.
The subreddits we will analyse here form a constel-
lation, within which all contributions are explicitly ded-
icated to fat hatred, approached from different angles.
Users can choose to share stories of how ridiculous fat
people are in fatpeoplestories, they can share examples
of fat people’s lack of rationality in fatlogic, or—if they
just want to let it all out—go for fatpeoplehate. Some
would argue that Reddit is a particularly harsh place, and
that the explicit hatred expressed in those subreddits is
not indicative of the rest of society. We would instead
argue that Reddit is nowhere near the harshest place
in the Internet world. Places such as 4chan2 and Storm-
front3 take the proverbial cake and eat it before Reddit
has even had time to lift its fork.We argue that Reddit, as
a democratically functioning platformwhere anyone can
express anything, simply allows its users to be more ex-
plicit about the assumptions underwhich they operate in
everyday life. From the experience of one Reddit author
as a fat person, the only difference between the attitude
of Reddit users to the ones the author encounters in ev-
eryday life is the opacity with which the assumptions are
put to use.While in everyday life these assumptions func-
tion in a polite subtext, the anonymity of Reddit brings
them to the surface in all their explicitness.
On the sidebar of fatpeoplestories, one can find the
rules of what constitutes a good ‘fat people story’. This
is the first place where we detected an interesting di-
chotomy, ‘Hamplanets vs fat people’. According to the
sidebar, “This sub is a place for you to tell us about ham-
planets in your life and your relationships/encounters
with them. Remember that hamplanet is not just about
the weight, but also the hamentality—rudeness, entitle-
ment, fatlogic, etc. Not all fat people are hambeasts but
all hambeasts are fat people”. This issue is further ex-
plored by the users of the subreddit. In a submission
appropriately titled “Hamplanets vs fat people” (2013),
user KangK brings up a quote by Roald Dahl, whichwould
not normally be expected to appear in a place dedicated
to fat hatred. The user’s submission reads:
“If a person has ugly thoughts, it begins to show on
their face. And when that person has ugly thoughts
every day, every week, every year, the face gets uglier
and uglier until you can hardly bear to look at it. A per-
sonwho has good thoughts can never be ugly. You can
have awonky nose and a crookedmouth and a double
chin and stick out teeth, but if you have good thoughts
itwill shine out of your face like sunbeams and youwill
always look lovely. (Roald Dahl, The Twits, 1979)
I feel like this quote is relevant whenwe distinguish be-
tween fat people and hamplanets. After all, so long as
the fat person doesn’t have absurd logic or a ridiculous
sense of entitlement,wedon’t consider than [sic] ham-
planets, do we? They are not the people that we are
criticising.” (KangK, “Hamplanets vs fat people”, n.d.)
User MCprofK replies: “I love this subreddit, but I must
be honest that some things that it stands for aren’t en-
tirely clear from the start. Now, I won’t try to speak for
the entire sub, but this is our opinion. Fat people are dis-
gusting. But this is the thing....To me, to be truly a ‘fat
person’ you have to have the fat mentality, or simply not
realize it at all, and accept none of the guilt” (MCprofK,
“Hamplanets vs fat people”, n.d.).
Let us make the distinction between ‘hamplanets’
and fat people more comprehensible. According to this
approach, there are fat people, and they are deemed
repulsive. However, there exists a hierarchy in how re-
pulsive they are: to be deemed a ‘hamplanet’, he or she
must also be characterized by self-entitlement and rude-
ness, and afflicted by fatlogic. The standing definition of
fatlogic in the UrbanDictionary (n.d.) reads:
“The astounding mental gyrations obese people use
to justify their size. Fatlogic never, ever includes eat-
ing too much and exercising too little.
‘Fatlogic insists that five triple cheeseburgers doused
with mayonnaise are balanced by a diet soft drink.’
‘I’m not fat, I’m just large-boned.’
‘I have a condition; I gainweight for no reason at all.’—
Said when finishing the fourth bag of cookies before
noon.”
Whereas in everyday life fat people are concernedly rep-
rimanded for their health-choices and self-management,
here, in the seeming safety of the internet, the advisory
tone is crystallised into an underlying question: where
is your logic? Since the pastoral power exercised by the
websites, specialists, dieticians, doctors, and diet blog-
gers have made the dangers of fatness entirely clear,
‘hamplanets’ must be operating under a completely dif-
ferent set of rules, a warped and greasy logic that pre-
vents them from seeing things clearly. It stops them
from utilising the information supplied to rationally man-
age themselves and adjust, adapt, andmanipulate them-
selves to ensure the worth of their capital, enjoy the
benefits of self-regulation, and, by extension, offer these
benefits to the rest of society. Here, we would like to
point out how claiming the existence of some inherently
negative qualities that fat people share—qualities that
function as the reasons for any hatred expressed towards
fatness—echoes fat persons’ failure to properly regulate
themselves, this time as social beings, while allowing the
2 www.4chan.org
3 www.stormfront.org
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hater to relinquish all responsibility for his or her “atti-
tude”. Like the website in our first analysis, the users of
this site would have us believe that the focus is not even
on fatness itself. It is on all the repercussions that come
with being fat. On the other websites, the repercussions
were framed in terms of health. Here, they are framed in
terms of being hideous. Interestingly though, the distinc-
tion between ‘hamplanets’ and fat people does not en-
joy unanimous support. The highest upvoted comment
in the submission reads:4
“Tome, anyonewho let’s go of themselves to become
obese has a problem, regardless of how pleasant they
are. I can’t hold them to equal esteemas Iwould other
people, the same way I wouldn’t hold someone who
doesn’t bathe and shave very highly. Taking care of
yourself is a good indicator of how you deal with other
situations, people who don’t care about themselves
are less likely to care about other standards.” (KangK.
“Hamplanets vs. fat people”, n.d.)
Following this logic, by allowing themselves to get fat,
people demonstrate how little they value the gift of
freedom and self-regulation that neoliberalism has given
us. By allowing their bodies to get fat, fat people have
demonstrated their failure to rationally govern them-
selves, and should subsequently be ready to relinquish
any claims to respect since they have already committed
the ultimate act of disrespect towards themselves and,
ultimately, towards humanity.
3. Managing the Body and Manipulating the Body:
Bioethics and Posthumanism
In light of such neoliberal tendencies of self-enhance-
ment, wewish to position posthuman theories, aswell as
their related technological practices aimed at human en-
hancement, in a critical, and possiblymore complex, rela-
tionship to cultural conceptions of embodiment, such as
fatness. One field of research, which promises to keep an
overly one-sided trend towards human enhancement in
check, is bioethics. Bioethics, as the term suggests, stud-
ies the critical relations between new developments in
the “bio-sciences” and philosophical, as well as political
and practical, questions of value, dignity, and care. In
Bioethics in the Age of New Media (2009), Joanna Zylin-
ska defines bioethics as a response to developments in
biotechnology and medicine that raises “philosophical
questions about the constitution of the boundaries of
the human and human life, as well as considering policy
implications of such developments for government bod-
ies, health care institutions, and other social organs. It is
thus always already a clinically driven ‘expert discourse,’
which can then be applied to ‘real-life cases’” (p. 5).
However, despite bioethics’ potential to keep certain
technological developments and translation to everyday
practice in check, critical bioethicists warn against the
field’s biased approach to notions of embodiment, hu-
man norms, and political goals. Zylinska explains that
what binds differing approaches to bioethics is that they
all embrace a sense of normativity, which is “filled with
positive content” (p. 5); they call for universal and appli-
cable moral judgements on the basis of “the rational hu-
man subject that can make a decision and that is seen
as the source of this decision” (p. 5). The universalizing
and normative standards of bioethical theories therefore
seem to hide the fact that bioethics has become an in-
tegral component of neoliberal regulatory practices. In
When Species Meet (2008), Donna Haraway even argues
that bioethics “acts as a regulatory discourse after all the
really interesting, generative action is over” (p. 136).
However, following Zylinska’s timeline, bioethics also
seems prescriptive, not just descriptive. It seems to gen-
erate a discourse that does not simply regulate themoral-
ity of what already exists, but dictates a type of morality
of both the present and the future. In its role of regulat-
ing medical discoveries regarding the body, bioethics op-
erates under the assumption that manipulating the body
through science is an imperative, not a choice. When
theorists such as Peter Singer go as far as to support
“the distinction between a ‘human being’ and a ‘per-
son,’ with only the latter, characterised by rationality and
self-awareness, being worthy of ethical respect” (Singer
quoted in Zylinska, 2009, p. 13), the ‘person’ in ques-
tion is expected to be self-aware and rational, and thus
to rationally choose to make use of current or future
medical science to achieve the best possible results for
his or her health. This assumption shows the existing re-
lationship between rationality and morality within the
field of bioethics itself. An irrational subject who would
refuse to use these technologies would also fail moral-
ity, and therefore would not be worthy of ethical respect
or ‘personhood’.
The “hamplanets” of fatpeoplehate would directly
fall under Singer’s categorisation of ‘human being’,
thereby falling outside ‘personhood’, as they have failed
to demonstrate a sense of rationality and, by deny-
ing the guilt of their condition, have not exhibited self-
awareness. We would like to stress here that Singer’s dif-
ferentiation between person and human being is a dis-
tinction in degrees that will necessarily create the likeli-
hood for subjects to fall outside of both, which is how
humanity is contested too—albeit in dangerous ways.
Thus, by eventually failing in both of Singer’s categories,
fat subjects are logically “not worthy of ethical respect”.
Or one could see the fat subject’s position somewhere
between neither/nor, where both ‘neither’ (quite a per-
son) and ‘nor’ (quite a human being) have been im-
bued with specific meanings. On this background, HFR
assumes that a responsible, rational, and moral subject
must maintain her or his position through an active at-
tempt to sustain her or his good health. What happens,
4 Depending on whether a user agrees or disagrees with a comment they can either upvote or downvote it by clicking the orange or the blue arrow next
to it.
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though, if we take the moral responsibility of an already
unattainable super-health and stretch it to its logical con-
clusion? Earlier, we mentioned the irreducibility of striv-
ing for what is ‘good for you’. Here, constant techno-
logical innovations that target human enhancement irre-
ducibly and seamlessly lead to a striving for what is ‘even
better for you’. And this irreducibility comes with its own
extended morality. Zylinska explains the work of John
Harris, a renowned supporter of human enhancement:
“Harris posits the need for enhancement as a univer-
sal ‘moral imperative’ and seems to have a very clear
sense what this ‘enhancement’ actually means. His
‘better people’ will be more intelligent, more beauti-
ful, but also ‘longer-lived, stronger, happier, smarter,
fairer (in the aesthetic and in the ethical sense of that
term)’—in other words, ‘more of everything we want
to be’” (Harris quoted in Zylinska, 2009, p. 14)
Human (prosthetic) enhancement is thus positioned as
merely the next step to which the trifecta of responsi-
bility, rationality, and morality should aspire and com-
ply. What we aim to highlight here is that bioethics does
not merely function as retroactive (or even passive), as
Haraway seems to suggest, but as pro-active and in-
fluential on the discourse at-large. Technology, science,
and their medical consequences are decidedly placed
as the most important factors in identifying who passes
as a human being. Bioethics is therefore not only con-
cerned with current practices, but is also instrumental in
imagining future advancements and their moral implica-
tions. This imagined future, to some degree, takes place
within posthumanism, a field that, while distinct from
bioethics, shares many of its concerns and imageries.
Both bioethics and posthumanism are concerned with
what counts as personhood; bioethics works to delineate
it, and posthumanism to expand it. Both fields share a
fascination with technological advancements and a rela-
tion to the body; bioethics is more focused on regula-
tion, and posthumanism on anticipation. A fundamen-
tal difference between the two fields is that bioethics
seeks to categorise, while posthumanism aims to de-
stroy boundaries and blur distinctions. However, even
within the field of post humanism—and with all of its
critical good intentions—notions of responsibility, ratio-
nality, and morality continue to hide behind many cele-
bratory anticipations of prosthetic bodily enhancement
and cyborg embodiment. We would like to thus venture
into this field and problematize the areas in which such
biopolitical narratives are reproduced in posthumanist
discourse, using fatness as our shining “b(e)acon”. Our
main focus will be on prosthesis as both metaphor and
materiality, and the ways in which, as demonstrated by
Harris, it becomes a societal imperative (Harris quoted in
Zylinska p. 14). The fat body, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, here serves as the limit case5 for both posthu-
man theory and a project of contesting humanity. The
concept of prosthesis, as inspired by the works of Jain
(1999) and Sobchack (2006), signifies both human en-
hancement and inhuman differentiation between bodies
termed “worthy” or “unworthy” of human life.
Before we continue with our analysis around fatness
and posthuman bodies, we feel the need to outline our
understanding of what posthumanism is and how bod-
ies and prostheses function within it. There seem to
be as many definitions of posthumanism as there are
articles about it, and the same is true for approaches
to the concept of prosthesis. In Discipline and Prac-
tice: The (Ir)Resistibility of Theory (2004), Herbrechter
and Callus identify as many as six impossible things
before breakfast—six types of post humanism—while
articles such as Damien Broderick’s “Trans and Post”
(2013) indicate the tensions that exist within the disci-
pline itself, with representatives of different branches of
posthumanism attempting to delineate their approaches
and distance them from or position them against those
of others.
Our own understanding of posthumanism is in-
formed by several texts, the central of which is Kather-
ine Hayles’ volume HowWe Became Posthuman: Virtual
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999):
“What is the posthuman? Think of it as a point of view
characterized by the following assumptions….First,
the posthuman view privileges information pattern
over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a
biological substrate is seen as an accident of history
rather than an inevitability of life. Second, the posthu-
man view considers consciousness, regarded as the
seat of human identity in the Western tradition long
before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as
an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart try-
ing to claim that it is the whole show when in actu-
ality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthu-
man view thinks of the body as the original prosthe-
sis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or
replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a
continuation of a process that began before we were
born. Fourth, andmost important, by these and other
means, the posthuman view configures the humanbe-
ing so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intel-
ligent machines.” (pp. 2–3)
The body becomes “the original prosthesis”, a body to
be manipulated by the subject, according to her or his
wishes—a body to be fused, extended, and imbued with
social meaning and function. In this sense, we find that
there is a definite overlap between what is expected of
a homo economicus and a posthuman subject regarding
their bodies. Where the homo economicus is expected
to rationally manage his or her body in order to secure
his or her well-being, the posthuman subject is expected
to manipulate his or her body in order to remain faith-
ful to the ongoing evolution of prosthetic embodiment.
5 A case that tests the theory as well as humanity because of its extreme/special relation to both.
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Whereas the homo economicus should aspire to main-
tain his body in the best possible condition, the post hu-
man subject should now aspire to expand the body to
the best imaginable position by allowing the inclusion
of cyberneticmechanisms.Management refers to reality,
to the existing means and resources and their allocation,
whilemanipulation extendsmanagement to the realm of
possibilities and imagination.
In her article, “The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling
and Disabling the Prosthetic Trope” (1999), Sarah S. Jain
argues that the ways in which the trope of the pros-
thesis is theorised promotes “the notion that the pros-
thesis compensates for some sort of physical disability—
although this disability may be in relation only to the
realm of the possible rather than a handicap in the way
in which it is classically conceived” (p. 33). Thus, no mat-
ter how alluring the idea of a posthuman subject with-
out boundaries may be, it seems that, in many of its
appearances, the trope of the prosthesis does not truly
transgress or eradicate, but instead reinforces and mul-
tiplies the restrictive expectations that surround the ne-
oliberal subject.
As Jain further explains, when used uncritically, the
trope of the prosthesis entails two dangerous assump-
tions: first, that a disabled or non-able body is inherently
flawed and needs correction, and, second, that all bod-
ies are potentially disabled when juxtaposed with their
posthuman, enhanced possibilities. In this manner, the
biopolitical body-machine relation stays firmly in place.
The body is still subjected to the same kind of imperative
that demands its placement under constant moral, ratio-
nal, and responsible social imperatives. In the biopolitical
context, Skrabanek speaks of super-health (1994, p. 42),
and HFR positions its viewer between a frumpy Hell and
a shiny Heaven. This narrative is present in many pros-
thetic imaginations, where subjects find themselves not
only morally responding to the realm of the possible but
also to that of the imaginary. The end result in both cases
is a subject with a body machine that requires constant
modification. If we were to follow Singer’s distinctive
logic of the human being versus the person, both homo
economicus and the posthuman subjectwould find them-
selves in a position where they have to earn their right to
ethical respectwhile simultaneously struggling to remain
within the human category.
Homo economicus is, then, the condition for the hu-
man subject, while the enhanced body becomes the con-
dition for the posthuman subject. When the prosthetic
imagination is allowed an uncritical and central role in
posthuman embodiment, it comes to reinforce the same
boundaries posthumanism wishes to transgress while
simultaneously strengthening neoliberal narratives that
oppress the body. Again, the posthuman subject needs
to be rational and recognise its insufficiency compared
with its prosthetic capabilities. It must be responsible,
and take action towards achieving its potentiality. Fi-
nally, it must be moral, as morality requires one to com-
bine rationality and responsibility. If it seems we are
vindictively rubbing our hands together, it is because—
metaphorically—we are. Return to our reading of the
HFR image and its positioning of the viewer as neither
in Heaven nor in Hell. Now add posthuman fantasies to
the mix, and we get a highly satisfying procedure when
the aim is to blur categorical boundaries.With prosthetic
enhancement at the centre of current bioethical discus-
sion, Jain’s argument demonstrates how easily the per-
ceived viewers of HFR can slip from their comfortable
Purgatory straight into Hell if they fail to adapt and ratio-
nally respond to this renegotiation of neoliberal ideology.
In the health/fitness versus illness/fatness schema, view-
ers can feel confident in their responsibility, rationality,
andmorality. This time, however, when responsibility, ra-
tionality, and morality are expanded ad infinitum, where
do viewers find themselves on the human vs. failed hu-
man scale?
In The Fat Studies Reader (2009), Marilyn Wann de-
scribes fat/fatness as “a floating signifier, attaching to
individuals based on a power relationship, not a physi-
cal measurement” (p. xiv). In this paper, we attempted
to paint a prosthetic nightmare. We took the theoreti-
cal characteristics of the prosthetic trope, turned them
around, and demonstrated how they can be applied in
imagining a prosthesis that renders the body, and thus
the subject, not more, but less human. By positioning
fatness as itself a kind of “prosthesis”, we intended to
point out how—if we add posthumanism to neoliberal
ideals—a fat subject can crumble beneath the weight of
her or his now supersized, double failure. As homines eco-
nomici, fat subjects fail to optimally manage themselves;
as posthuman beings, they fail to adapt to the ever-
growing, accelerating capabilities of the human body.
Unlike most prosthetic narratives, the fat body as pros-
thetic embodiment is no longer something that makes
the body faster, stronger, and more productive, thus ‘im-
proving’ it, but something that hinders its productivity
and reflects negatively on its owner’s ability to success-
fullymanage andmanipulate the body’s own place in the
category of the human.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, we will attempt to paint a hopefully less
nightmarish image of contested humanity by proposing
an outlook for the development of different strands of
embodied theory that take seriously the impact criti-
cal versions of posthumanism and disability theory may
make on dominant bodily beliefs and practices. We want
to ask what, if anything, could a critical posthuman-
ist and disability studies approach inject into the just
painted nightmare? Certainly the most productive the-
oretical contributions to challenge neoliberal biopolitics
have come from critical engagements with marginalised
embodied experience and subjectivity, such as in femi-
nist, queer, critical race, and disability studies. However,
as recent trends in interdisciplinary humanities research
have proven (new materialism, critical posthumanism),
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an engagement with the non-human, material, animal,
planetary, and ecological entanglement of human bodies
with the world is similarly crucial to a critical discourse of
human life.
What this paper attempted was a dialogue between
embodied human difference and more-than-human ma-
terial practices (technologies) as they have been pow-
erfully incorporated into neoliberal ideology. What re-
mains to be further explored and—hopefully—critically
embedded in a future body-politics is a discourse that
contests more concretely what Astrida Neimanis has
described as “a neoliberal, individualistic reproductive
imaginary of commodification and amnesiac bioscien-
tific progress” (2014, p. 109), which fosters discrimina-
tion against bodily difference and is primarily focused on
preservation of the self-same. A counter-discourse will
need to take a critical stance towards all-too-human, ra-
tional, technical, progressive, and linear expressions of
human futures, and take seriously a more-than-human,
affective, transcorporeal, elusive, and messy imaginary
of embodied lives.
Fat studies, disability theory, and a critical take on
posthumanist theory are but a fewways to sketch amore
inclusive future for those who contest not humanity as
such, but a neoliberal propagation of seemingly humane
cultural practices.
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